F
ive years following its inauguration, the WTO, arguably "the single most effective international organisation '' 1 but certainly the driving force behind multilateral trade liberalisation, experienced a major set-back. Not the presence of outraged protestors, but a seemingly mundane dispute among delegates over placing competition policy and antidumping on the agenda of the "millennium round" of trade talks led to the termination of the Seattle summit in December 1999. The EU and Japan had argued for extending the scope of GAI-I-/WTO law from its current focus on public border measures to those domestic policies and private actions threatening to foreclose markets and distort competition. As part of that plan, WTO members were asked to enforce competition rules in line with shared principles for cases with an international dimension, particularly dumping allegations, and to agree to agency cooperation and binding dispute settlement? US representatives, however, saw no value in a trade-focused forum setting competition standards, or "second-guessing complex national prosecutorial decisions". 3 It was held that, without a global consensus on economic, legal and procedural principles, efforts to harmonise fairly diverse national regulations would create lowestcommon-denominator rules, politicise national antitrust enforcement, and overburden the WTO system. And yet, some statutory initiative seems vital lest the swelling of discriminatory trade measures continue to undermine the integrity of international accords, impair the benefits and predictability of global production and commerce, and impose huge direct * International Institute for Management Development (IMD), Lausanne, Switzerland.
welfare costs. What is the rationale behind proposing a switch from trade policy to competition policy in dealing with matters arising from international commerce? Does it require the scope of the WTO to be expanded? Are concerns for national sovereignty or income redistribution limiting broader economic integration? Or are we facing the political limits of globalisation, set by national authorities unwilling to forgo discretion over the domestic allocation of trade protection? What are the implications for business?
This article offers a concise perspective on these issues, tt sketches the global growth and costs of international antidumping actions. It then takes the US system of trade administration as an example to review antidumping processes and standards and to point to a general need for redirecting policies to pursue long-term efficiencies and consumer benefits. Next, it discusses how to motivate a switch from current practice. Finally, it evaluates the pros and cons for expanding the scope of the VVTO in a system that deals with private and public market distortions.
Trade, Antidumping and the Costs of Protection
Since the signing of the GAFF by 23 mostly industrialised nations in 1947, 136 countries have bound themselves to multilateral trade concessions.
I See W. A. N i s k a n e n : Building on the WTO's Success, in: Cato Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 2000, pp. 459-461. In the process, they significantly lowered and "lockedin" tariffs on manufactured goods, and addressed barriers to trade ranging from government subsidies and procurement, to regulations of services, sanitation or intellectual property rights. Since 1950, the volume of world trade grew 16-fold, at three times the rate of global output." Awaiting the inclusion of China and Russia, 85% of the world population and 95% of world trade will soon be tied to a "single undertaking." In contrast to the GAFF, the WTO commits signatories to one common set of rules and disciplines whose application may be challenged in the course of a binding dispute settlement process. However, it is this control and the elimination of significant barriers to trade that contributed to a sharp increase in various forms of contingent protection, which are not yet subject to multilateral trade agreements. The prime example, antidumping action, is to relieve domestic producers from "unfair" and "injurious" low-price imports.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the WTO countedin total 405 antidumping orders, 193 of which were protecting US markets; by 1997, the United States accounted for 294 out of, in total, 832 orders. While the US had been the most active user of antidumping in the ten years to 1987, emerging markets such as India, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil have since become increasingly important users of antidumping proceedings? Still in 1999, with the total number of antidumping investigations rising to 328 from an annual average of 232 for the preceding three years, traditional users (the USA, EU, Australia, Canada) accounted for 46%, with the EU taking first place? Clearly, WTO-condoned antidumping action has spread to become the global trade remedy of choice. It is also a very costly one for most parties involved.
Restricting imports affects domestic competition, income distribution and incentives across a range of interrelated markets and sectors and fuels costly, "rent-seeking" activities just to maintain the "benefits of protection". Aggregating these various factors, the net economic costs of current US antidumping and countervailing duty actions are estimated to be $ 4 billion per annum. 7 Of the about 250 antidumping petitions filed by US steel producers since 1980, around one hundred are still enforced twenty years later. They currently "protect" less than 0.1% of the US labour force at an estimated 40% cost-penalty to steel consuming sectors employing more than 50 times as many workers? Similar efforts in the 1980s to protect the US car industry cut consumers' real incomes between US$ 3.50 and US$ 5.50 for each dollar of added profit; each job saved cost consumers between US$ 93,000 and US$ 250,000 per year. 9 Comparable figures can be found for most economies delaying adjustments while claiming to benefit from free trade. 1~
But even more concerning than the evident resource waste, the rationale for imposing antidumping measures, commonly based on some foreign "unfair" private anti-competitive conduct or discriminatory governmental policy, only rarely lives up to domestic competition standards or broader economic principles. Willig concludes that less than 10% of international antidumping petitions in the United States, the EU and Canada in the 1980s could be justified on competition policy grounds. 11 Rather, dumping duties present domestic producers with a targeted firm or country specific trade weapon whose threatened use alone may cause international competitors to raise prices or restrain sales and effectively agree to collude at the consumers' expense? 2 They are the outcome of a domestic policy-making process that discounts
